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Abstract 
In most countries, basic research is supported by research councils that select, after peer 
review, the individuals or teams that are to receive funding. Unfortunately, the number of 
grants these research councils can allocate is not infinite and, in most cases, a minority of the 
researchers receive the majority of the funds. However, evidence as to whether this is an 
optimal way of distributing available funds is mixed. The purpose of this study is to measure 
the relation between the amount of funding provided to 12,720 researchers in Québec over a 
fifteen year period (1998-2012) and their scientific output and impact from 2000 to 2013. Our 
results show that both in terms of the quantity of papers produced and of their scientific 
impact, the concentration of research funding in the hands of a so-called ‘elite’ of researchers 
generally produces diminishing marginal returns. Also, we find that the most funded 
researchers do not stand out in terms of output and scientific impact. 
Introduction 
In most countries, basic research is supported by governmental research councils that select, 
after peer review, the individuals or teams that are to receive funding. In Québec, for example, 
70.5% of external research funding comes from three provincial and three national research 
councils (Robitaille & Laframboise 2013). Unfortunately, the budgets of these research 
councils are limited and, thus, a large proportion of grant proposals—as well as scholars—
remain unfunded. For example, a previous study showed that 20% to 45% of Québec’s 
researchers, depending on the discipline, had no external funding between 1999 and 2006 
(Larivière et al. 2010). Along these lines, national scientific agencies, including the National 
Science Foundation (NSF – United States) and the Canadian Institutes of Health (CIHR) tend 
to give fewer grants of a higher value, which leads to high rejection rates (Joós 2012; CIHR 
2012; NSF 2013) as well as to an increased concentration of available funds in the hands of a 
few researchers. More specifically, 10% of the researchers funded by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) accumulate 80% of available funds, 10% 
of those funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) obtain 50% of the 
funds, and 10% of those funded by the NSERC accumulate 57% of the funds1. The situation is 
similar in Québec when we combine funding from the national and provincial agencies: 20% 
of researchers obtain 80% of the funds in social sciences and humanities (SSH), 50% of the 
funds in health, and 57% of the funds in natural sciences and engineering (NSE) (Larivière et 
al. 2010). 
 
In an attempt to ensure that the funds are effectively used, the NIH started doing special 
analyses of applicants who are already receiving more than one million dollars in grants. At 
the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), this practice of special review 
for researchers who are already holding a large sum of funding has been going on for more 
than 20 years (Berg 2012). Still, with a few researchers receiving most of the funds available 
and many not receiving any, it seems legitimate to ask whether this concentration of funds 
leads to better collective gains than funding policies that promote a more even distribution of 
funding.  
 
                                                 
1 Data compiled by the Observatoire des Sciences et Technologies (OST) using results of competition for each of 
the councils, and the Almanac of Post-Secondary Education in Canada, of the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers. 
  
This study aims to contribute to the discussion on the optimal level of research funding by 
analysing the relationship between all funding received by all of Québec’s researchers over a 
period of 15 years (1998-2012) and their research output and impact from 2000 to 2013. More 
specifically, it aims at answering two questions: 1) how do research productivity and 
scientific impact of individual researchers vary with the amount of funding they receive? 2) is 
this variation similar in the three general fields of science that are health, natural sciences and 
engineering, and social sciences? 
 
Theoretical framework 
The scientific community is a field (i.e. a social space) involving agents that share a common 
goal (the production of knowledge) and compete against each other for their peers’ 
recognition (Bourdieu 1976). In order to work efficiently (i.e., to maximise knowledge 
production), the scientific community developed a reward system which provides different 
forms of recognition to scientists who best achieved this goal (Merton 1957). This results in a 
social stratification of the scientific community (Cole & Cole 1973), which in turns leads to 
what Zuckerman (1998) described as an effect of accumulation of advantages and 
disadvantages. This process starts at the very beginning of scientists’ careers, as those with 
the most potential are given more resources (e.g., obtain scholarships, get accepted in 
prestigious departments, etc.) which will have both short and long term effects on their 
scientific career and thus will help acquire even more resources. When such a system is 
working optimally, it should yield exponential returns in terms of knowledge production since 
the best researchers have more resources and can, moreover, use them more efficiently than 
their colleagues with fewer resources (Zuckerman 1998). If we consider research funding, the 
reward system should, in theory, give more resources to the best researchers who will, in turn, 
produce more or better output.  
 
However, some elements within of the reward system itself may have a negative impact on its 
efficiency, one of them being the Matthew effect described by Merton (1968). As highlighted 
by Laudel (2005), funding decisions are based not only on the quality of the research proposal 
but also on the quality of the researchers, which is to a large extent assessed by the 
researcher’s past accomplishments. We may thus wonder if, and to what extent, research 
funding becomes less of an instrumental reward, geared towards maximizing knowledge 
production, and more of an honorific reward. According to Schmoch & Schubert (2009), this 
shift is a consequence of the growing scarcity of research funds.  
 
Also, in practice, a number of factors (e.g., limited time, administrative and teaching 
responsibility) may limit individual researchers’ productivity, so that such exponential returns 
can hardly be expected. Larger projects requiring more resources and more people may also 
require more coordination effort, and getting more funding also requires spending more time 
writing grant proposals. Thus, we might expect that lower amounts of funding will yield 
greater returns in terms of scientific output and impact, and that these returns will start 
decreasing with higher amounts of funding.  
Literature review 
Despite the central role of research funding in the current research system, its relation to 
research outcomes has not been extensively studied. Some studies have looked at the 
influence of funding—using funding acknowledgements as an indicator—on the scientific 
  
impact of articles. For instance, Zhao (2010) analysed a small sample of articles published in 
7 core LIS journal and found that funded articles had, in general, a higher impact and, on 
average, were cited faster than non-funded articles. She, however, observed that the two most 
cited articles did not disclose any funding. A similar study using a subset of Iranian 
publication concluded that the average citation rate of funded articles (as determined by 
acknowledgements) is higher than that of unfunded papers (Jowkar et al. 2011). Other studies 
have examined the impact and productivity of scientists who see their application granted 
versus the ones whose applications are rejected. Two studies, one from Canada (Campbell et 
al. 2010) and the other from the Netherlands (van Leeuwen & Moed 2012), found that 
researchers who receive a grant tend to have higher citation impact than applicants who did 
not receive funding. A third study, focused more on research productivity than scientific 
impact, found that professors with external funding published more than the ones with no 
external funding (Gulbrandsen and Smeby 2005). These studies suggest that receiving 
funding has a positive effect on a researcher’s scientific output. 
Other studies have investigated the relationship between the amount of funding received and 
research productivity and scientific impact, first at high levels of aggregation. Towards the 
end of the 1970’s, the relationship between R&D expenditure and the number of papers was 
investigated at the level of universities, for 11 different fields (McAllister and Wagner 1981). 
A strong indication of a linear relationship was found. In the 1990’s, Moed and colleagues 
(1998) analysed the productivity of Flemish university departments, finding that those with 
the highest externally funded capacity2 had a strong decrease in publication productivity. 
More recently, the effect of the amount of funding was studied at the individual level. Heale 
et al. (2004) reported that one of the strongest determinants of the number of papers published 
was the amount of funding received. Moreover, they concluded that an increase in funding 
was associated with an increase in the number of articles, but not proportionally. Nag et al. 
(2013) reached a similar conclusion regarding the number of publications after studying a 
sample of 720 American bioscientists. More precisely, the authors calculated that increasing a 
laboratory’s budget by 10% lifts article output by only 7.5%, thus suggesting decreasing 
marginal returns. Fortin and Currie (2013) also found decreasing marginal returns when they 
looked at the number of publications of Canadian researchers in Integrative Animal Biology, 
Inorganic & Organic Chemistry and Evolution & Ecology who received NSERC funding. 
Along these lines, Berg (2010) observed that the number of publications of NIGMS grantees 
did not increase linearly with the amount of funding they received, but rather appeared to 
reach a plateau (Berg 2010). Lastly, a few studies discussing the validity of external funding 
as an indicator to evaluate researchers have also found that the output typically rises with 
funding until a point where it reaches a plateau and eventually starts decreasing (e.g., Laudel 
2005; Schmoch & Schubert 2009; Schmoch et al. 2010). For low values of third-party funds, 
increasing them also increases efficiency. However, when the funding reaches a certain 
threshold value, its efficiency stops increasing and starts decreasing (Schmoch & Schubert 
2009). On the whole, evidence on the relationship between research funding and various 
output of research does not converge—mainly because of different methods used and 
population studied—although many papers seem to suggest that the relationship between 
funding and research outputs is not linear.  
                                                 
2 Moed et al (1998) define the research capacity as the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) spent on scientific 
research, the externally funded research capacity being funded by external sources (i.e. other than the 
researchers’ basic allowance). 
  
Data  
Data on funding for all Québec’s academic researchers from 1998 to 2012 were obtained from 
the Information System on University Research (SIRU), an administrative database from the 
Québec provincial government that covers all funded research in Québec’s universities. 
Access to this data was provided by the Observatoire des sciences et des technologies (OST). 
The funding data includes different types of funding (e.g., grants, contracts and internal 
funding), but we chose to include only grants as they represent the bulk of university funding 
and are awarded through peer-review. Those grants were given out by more than 900 hundred 
organizations and amounted to $8.1 Billion, most funds (about 50%) being given out by the 
three Federal research councils of Canada (the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council [SSHRC], the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council [NSERC] and the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research [CIHR]), as well as the three research councils in 
Québec (The Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture [FRQ-SC], the Fonds de 
recherche du Québec – Nature et Technologie [FRQ-NT] and the Fonds de recherche du 
Québec – Santé [FRQ-S]).  
 
Publication data for each researcher were obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science 
for the 2000-2013 period. The Web of Science data was also provided by the OST, which 
maintains up to date disambiguated publication data for all Québec researchers since 2000. 
Then, researchers were divided into four broad research disciplines: Arts and Humanities 
(AH), Social Sciences (SS), Natural Sciences and Engineering (NSE) and Health. Researchers 
were associated with the discipline in which most of their papers are published. Researchers 
for which no publications were found as well as those with the same number of publications 
in two or more disciplines were categorized according to their department. We decided to 
exclude AH researchers from our analysis considering the poor coverage of Arts and 
Humanities publications in the Web of Science described in previous studies (e.g., Larivière 
et al. 2006; Mongeon & Paul-Hus 2015). Therefore, this paper focuses on the remaining three 
disciplines: SS, NSE and Health. The number of researchers in each field, as well as the total 
number of papers and citations, is shown in Table 1. For each researcher, we calculated the 
total amount of funding received. The total funds attributed to each project were divided by 
the number of researchers on the application, each of them receiving an equal share.  
 
Three indicators were used to measure research outcomes of researchers: the total number of 
articles, the average relative citations (ARC) and the number of top cited articles (top 10% 
most cited in the sub-discipline). The ARC of individual papers is calculated by dividing the 
number of citations received by the paper by the average number of citations received by all 
papers of the same sub-discipline published in the same year. The sub-discipline is defined by 
the journal in which the paper is published, and the journal classification is based on the NSF 
classification which contains 144 sub-disciplines. This allows us to account for the time of 
publication and disciplinary differences in terms of citations. The amount of funding received 
as well the five outcome indicators were annualized to be able to compare researchers who 
were not active at the same time over the 1998 and 2013 period. To do this, we looked at the 
year of researchers’ first grant and the year of their first publication. The earliest of these two 
years was considered the first active year of the researcher. For example, if a researcher 
received his first grant in 2002 and published an article in 1999, he or she was considered 
active since 1999. Similarly, researchers were considered active until the year of their last 
publication or grant. The number of researchers, papers and citations included in our dataset is 
shown in Table 1. 
 
  
Table 1. Funded researchers, papers published and citations received in Québec 
Discipline 
Number of 
researchers 
Funded researchers 
Articles Citations 
Top cited 
articles N % 
Health 4,742 3,477 73.3% 65,131 1,992,894 10,063 
NSE 3,142 2,763 87.9% 51,792 885,680 7,306 
SS 4,836 3,877 80.2% 13,725 184,826 1,608 
Total 12,720 10,117 79.4% 130,648 3,063,400 18,977 
Analysis 
Marginal returns 
We used the Cobb-Douglas production function to see whether the annual research funding of 
researchers yields increasing, constant or decreasing marginal returns. Since funding is the 
only independent variable in our model, the Cobb-Douglas function takes the form 𝑙𝑛(𝑄) =
𝑙𝑛(𝛼) + 𝛽(𝑙𝑛(𝐾)) where Q is the output in terms of articles, ARC or Top cited articles, and K 
is the input in research funding. The intercept (α) and the coefficient (β) are calculated by 
running a linear regression on the natural logarithm of funding and the measured indicator. A 
β lower than 1 indicates decreasing marginal returns, a β equal to 1 indicates constant 
marginal returns and a β higher than 1 indicates increasing marginal returns. 
 
We used local regression (LOESS) to visualize the increasing, constant or diminishing 
marginal returns of research funding. The LOESS function fits a polynomial for each point in 
a scatterplot using weighted least squares on a subset of the data. More weight is given to the 
closest neighbours and less to the data points that are further away. We used a 50% smoothing 
parameter (50% of the data is used to fit the polynomial on each data point), to obtain a 
smooth curve that is not overly affected by normal variation in the data. 
 
Outlier analysis 
A first visual of our data displayed some obvious outliers (e.g., heavily funded under-
performers and minimally funded over-performers). To ensure that our analyses using the 
Cobb-Douglas and LOESS functions were robust, we performed the analyses on the complete 
dataset as well as in the dataset with the outliers removed. Outliers were identified statistically 
rather than manually, by running a linear regression on the data and calculating the Cook’s 
distance for each data point. We identified as outliers the points with a Cook’s distance higher 
than a limit obtained with formula 4/(n-k-1), where n is the number of data points and k is the 
number of independent variables. 
Results 
Distribution of research funding 
As Figure 1 shows, research funding provided to Québec researchers over the 1998-2012 
period is concentrated in the hands of a minority of researchers. In SS and health, about 20% 
of the researchers shared 80% of all funding given during that period. The funds were less 
concentrated in NSE, where 25% of the researchers shared 80% of the funds, than in the other 
fields. On the whole, these results confirm that research funds in Québec are indeed 
concentrated in the hands of a few researchers. 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of research funds among all researchers (1998-2012) 
 
Since we used articles published before 2013, our results could be affected if a 
disproportionately large amounts of funding had been awarded in recent years when the full 
output from those grants (in terms of both productivity and impact) will not yet have been 
achieved. Thus, we looked the evolution of the total amount of grants received by Québec’s 
researchers over the 1998-2012 period (Figure 2). We observe that funding in Health as 
greatly increased between 1998 and 2005, and has been relatively stable since then. In NSE, 
we observe a steady increase, going from 81 to 239 million $CAN over the same period. SS 
researchers received less funding than their colleagues in Health and NSE. Their total funding 
increased from 33 to 72 million $CAN between 1998 and 2004 and has been stable since 
then.  
 
Figure 2. Total amount of funding by discipline (1998-2012) 
 
We also looked at the 50 largest grants in each field to see if a larger share of them were 
obtained in the 2010-2013 period. Since it was not the case, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the possibly missing output from grants awarded in the last years of the period will not 
affect our results. 
 
Marginal returns of research funding 
The results of the Cobb-Douglas function used to determine whether increased research 
funding yields increasing, constant or decreasing marginal returns, are shown in Table 2. It 
provides the results in terms of the number of articles, the ARC and the number of top cited 
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articles for each field, as well as for both the complete data set and the data set without 
outliers. 
 
Table 2. Relation between the amount of funding and the research output and impact as 
measured by the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
 
For the complete dataset, the coefficients are all below 1, which means that, in each field and 
for each indicator, research funding yields decreasing marginal returns. Furthermore, this 
decrease is quite sharp given that the values of the coefficients are very small, ranging from 
0.079 for the top 10% most cited articles in social sciences to 0.321 for the number of articles 
in Natural Sciences and Engineering. However, outliers appear to have and important effect 
on these coefficients, especially in NSE and Health. Indeed, while we can still observe 
coefficients below 1 for most indicators once we remove the outliers, the coefficient are much 
higher for those fields, and it even becomes positive for top cited articles in NSE. Thus, in this 
field, the decreasing marginal returns observed in terms of top cited articles might be caused 
by the presence of highly influential outliers, who obtain a lot of funding and publish an 
important number of important papers.  
 
Figure 3 shows the scatterplots with a fitted a LOESS curve for each field and indicator. It 
excludes outliers, as they affect the trends. However, the outlier themselves might provide 
interesting insights on the relation between funding and performance, which will be discussed 
later in the paper. The distribution of the points on the graphs show a few interesting 
elements. First, the points are very densely concentrated on the left of the y-axis, and the 
density decreases as the funding increases. This is coherent with the funding landscape 
presented above, with most researchers obtaining relatively small amounts of funding, and 
around 20% obtaining no funding at all. Another interesting element is that researchers who 
get the highest scores for each indicator are also situated on the left of the y-axis. Conversely, 
apart from a few exception, researchers who receive large amounts of funding do not appear 
to get particularly high scores. Also, the scatterplots show a high variability in the indicators 
at any level of funding, which suggest that the performance of researchers depends only 
partially on the funding they receive and that other factors are likely to play an important role. 
  
N Coefficient Standard Error t Stat P-Value N Coefficient Standard Error t Stat P-Value
Intercept -2.723 0.052 -52.451 0.000 -4.355 0.216 -20.186 0.000
Funding 0.252 0.005 48.845 0.000 0.404 0.021 19.144 0.000
Intercept -3.053 0.052 -58.187 0.000 -3.493 0.222 -15.709 0.000
Funding 0.233 0.005 44.602 0.000 0.273 0.022 12.676 0.000
Intercept -6.065 0.057 -106.299 0.000 -10.351 0.317 -32.608 0.000
Funding 0.240 0.006 42.370 0.000 0.643 0.031 20.705 0.000
Intercept -4.049 0.087 -46.566 0.000 -10.214 0.402 -25.432 0.000
Funding 0.321 0.009 37.112 0.000 0.924 0.040 23.289 0.000
Intercept -4.691 0.095 -49.498 0.000 -10.567 0.458 -23.076 0.000
Funding 0.295 0.009 31.359 0.000 0.868 0.045 19.230 0.000
Intercept -7.335 0.103 -71.108 0.000 -17.351 0.509 -34.059 0.000
Funding 0.242 0.010 23.569 0.000 1.220 0.050 24.239 0.000
Intercept -6.123 0.071 -86.189 0.000 -10.425 0.398 -26.222 0.000
Funding 0.192 0.008 24.999 0.000 0.644 0.043 14.842 0.000
Intercept -6.554 0.073 -89.714 0.000 -11.496 0.412 -27.935 0.000
Funding 0.197 0.008 24.856 0.000 0.718 0.045 16.077 0.000
Intercept -8.521 0.047 -182.785 0.000 -11.521 0.252 -45.729 0.000
Funding 0.079 0.005 15.599 0.000 0.380 0.027 13.844 0.000
NSE
Articles
ARC
Top cited 
articles
Complete data set
Articles
ARC
Top cited 
articles
Health
SS
Articles
ARC
Top cited 
articles
4836
4836
4836
3142
4706
4742
4742
4742
3142
3142
3082
3066
3082
4705
4723
Without outliers
4570
4657
4579
  
 
 
Figure 3. Relation between the amount of funding and the research output and impact.  
* The vast majority of researchers in SS have no top cited articles. To avoid the LOESS curve to be pulled to 0, 
we kept only researchers with at least 1 top cited article.  
 
The LOESS curves display decreasing marginal returns similar to what was found using the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. In almost all cases, the curves show an important increase 
of the measured indicator at the lowest amount of funding, followed by a slower increase once 
a specific threshold is reached. In NSE, the curve even shows a decline at higher amounts of 
funding. One exception is the top cited articles indicator for researchers in SS, which shows a 
rather constant decline as funding increases. This suggests that funding might, in fact, have 
little effect on the production of top cited articles in Social Sciences. Health also stands out 
from the other two fields, as the LOESS curve shows an increase throughout the graph. Thus, 
if we take the disciplines globally, these results suggest that decreasing marginal returns could 
be more important in NSE with an eventual decline of the indicators. The decreasing returns 
would be less important in Health, where the indicators keep rising while SS are in between 
with a quick rise followed by a more or less horizontal LOESS curve. 
 
While it is not the purpose of this paper to determine an optimal amount of funding, the 
LOESS curves do provide some indications on the amount of funding that yields the highest 
return per dollar in each field. For example, in SS and Health, the first break in the line 
appears at around 50,000 $CAN. Here, the ARC in Health is an exception: it seems that the 
fact of being funded or not makes an important difference while the amount of funding has a 
much lower effect on the indicator. In NSE, the LOESS curve shows two breaks. The first 
one, similarly to Health and SS, occurs at around 50,000 $CAN annually. The curves then 
  
keep rising until they reach a point where they start decreasing, at around 300,000 $CAN 
annually. Some potential explanations for this specificity of NSE are provided in the 
discussion below. 
Discussion 
Our results show that funding is strongly related with the research productivity and scientific 
impact of individual researchers, although there are decreasing marginal returns for most of 
the indicators. Indeed, the number of articles, the average relative citations and the number of 
top cited articles showed a non-proportional increase with an increase in funding, until a 
certain point where they start to decrease. Moreover, when both inputs and outputs increase, 
the growth of outputs is not proportional to that of inputs, and decreasing marginal returns can 
be observed in that part of the LOESS curve. For the average relative citation rates (ARC), we 
observe a rapid growth until a plateau is reached. This also implies decreasing marginal 
returns.  
 
Most of the results presented above did not include outliers because of their potentially high 
influence on the trends observed. However, outliers provide important insights on the 
relationship between funding and outcomes. For example, many of the outliers were the most 
funded researchers in their field. More specifically, the 20 most funded researchers (who 
shared 13% of the total funding in their field over the whole 15 years period) in Health were 
kept out of the analysis, same for the 20 most funded scholars in NSE and SS, who shared 
22% and 14% of the total funding in the field, respectively. On average these outliers received 
27 times, 40 times and 32 times more funding than the rest of the researchers in Health, NSE 
and SS respectively, yet they “only” published on average 6, 5 and 19 times more than their 
average colleague. Moreover, from a scientific impact point of view, the 20 most funded 
scholars in Health and SS obtained citation rates that are respectively 1.68 and 1.15 times 
greater than the average scholar of their discipline, while they had on average a slightly lower 
ARC (0.732) than their average colleague (0.786) in NSE. On the other hand, many 
researchers with low funding but high output or impact were also identified as outliers. These 
two groups of outliers help to highlight the fact that having a lot of funding does not 
necessarily lead to a higher output or impact and that even researchers with low amounts of 
funding can achieve a high level of output and impact. Hence, at least from a bibliometric 
standpoint, this concentration of research funding in the hands of a minority of researchers 
brings no clear collective advantages in terms of output and impact, suggesting that such 
funding policies might not be efficient. Indeed, as decreasing marginal returns are observed, 
one may wonder what could justify awarding millions of dollars to a few researchers while 
many others receive nothing. Thus, in terms of funding policy, our results, along with those of 
Fortin and Currie (2013), support an approach where a higher number of smaller grants are 
given to a higher number of researchers rather than one where the funds are concentrated 
among a minority of researchers who obtain very large grants.   
 
There are many factors that could explain some of the decreasing marginal returns observed. 
One of them might be a change in the amount of time researchers have to spend on tasks other 
than research. For instance, one might argue that drafting grant proposals takes time and that 
obtaining higher amounts of funding might require researchers to spend more time writing 
grant proposals and less time performing research. Furthermore, highly funded researchers 
might be leading larger projects that require more coordination effort and time, which also 
reduce the amount of time left to do research. Moed et al. (1998) observed, in the 1980s, a 
decrease in the number of publications from Flemish universities that had the strongest 
  
increase in competitively acquired funding. They suggest that this might be because highly 
funded departments attract a large number of young scientists, which may require more 
supervision from the departments’ senior scientists. This reduces the time such experienced 
researchers (i.e. potentially more productive) spend on research, therefore decreasing their 
output. Similarly, Moed et al. (1998), pointed out that young foreign scientists were more 
likely to work in the highly funded departments. They suggested that those scientists were 
typically visiting for short periods and mostly for learning rather than publishing articles, 
which might, in turn, result in lower time for research for senior researchers because of their 
supervisory role. Some research projects may also require important investments in 
equipment or infrastructure, which do not necessarily lead to an increased output or impact. 
However, this factor should have little effect on the results of this study because, in Canada, 
infrastructure investments are typically funded by a specific organisation (Canadian 
Foundation for Innovation), and those grants were not included in our data. Furthermore, as 
Laudel (2005) suggests, the quality of a research proposal and the past performance of a 
researcher do not guarantee the success of external funding, which is also determined by 
factors that have little to do with quality and performance. Therefore, while receiving funding 
does provide researchers with the means to carry on their research projects, it does not 
guarantee that they will succeed at achieving publishable results. Also, a research project may 
simply be failing despite researchers asking for more and more funds to make it succeed.  
 
Another possibility is that, as we hypothesised, there is a Matthew effect in research funding. 
In a context where competition for research funding and the concentration of funds are both 
increasing, researchers who have acquired the esteem of their community from their past 
achievements have more facility than others to obtain funding, and moreover, to obtain larger 
ones. However, a large number of previous studies have found, researchers tend to be more 
productive early in their career (e.g., Cole 1979; Dennis 1956; Lehman 1953; Levin & 
Stephan 1991). This could partly explain the decreasing marginal returns observed. Also, 
research grants are sometimes used as a performance indicator, which encourages researchers 
to apply for more (and bigger) grants (Hornbostel 2001) that they might not necessarily need 
to perform their research. This could lead to an inefficient use of the funds received (Sousa 
2008). Finally, we may be observing a shift from research funding as an instrumental reward 
to research funding as an honorary reward as we move towards higher levels of funding. 
Smaller amounts of funding would be given to promising researchers and projects that 
produce higher returns while receiving funding beyond this point would be more likely related 
to past performance. Furthermore, some highly funded researchers might have relatively low 
scores in terms of output and impact because their work has different characteristics and 
because they play a different role (one that cannot be observed using bibliometric methods) in 
the scientific community. For example, Schmoch & Schubert (2009) and Schmoch et al. 
(2010) divided researchers in four main groups (networkers, educators, high producers and 
high impact researchers), all of them being, in their view, essential to the sustainability of the 
scientific system. While high producers publish many articles and high impact researchers are 
focused on high impact articles, networkers and educators focus on different aspect of the 
academic life. The existence of these different types of researchers could explain some of the 
variability in the results in general, and it may also be the case that some researchers of the 
non-publication focused types are overrepresented in among the most funded researchers. It 
could also be the case that researchers receiving larger grants do not always participate 
directly in the research funded by those grants (Boyack & Jordan 2011). To assess the extent 
to which these factors could have affected our results, we searched the top 20 most funded 
researchers in our dataset on the Web and looked at their academic profile. A majority of 
them were older researchers with important administrative functions. This was especially the 
  
case in NSE, where many deans and heads of departments were found among the top funded 
researchers. One possibility that would require further investigation is that, for example, these 
researchers might participate in the grant applications, using their reputation to improve the 
applications’ chances of success, while it is more their co-applicants who will use the funds to 
produce scientific output. 
Limitations 
In the present study, we used the entire population of Québec university researchers to analyse 
the relation between funding and the scientific output and impact. Our results show that 
researchers with a moderate amount of funding seem to provide better returns in terms of 
output or impact per dollar. In the discussion, many hypotheses regarding the different factors 
that could explain these observations have been suggested. This is the main limitation of this 
study: it does not take into account some of those potentially important confounding factors. 
Thus, further research should validate some of the hypotheses raised in our discussion by 
taking into account other independent variables such as the academic age of researchers, their 
role in the scientific community, the size and composition of teams, and some specificities of 
the funded projects. This will require a different design based on a subsample of our 
population for which this additional data will be needed. Further qualitative research could 
also focus on highly funded researchers to better understand the way they work and 
participate in the scholarly communication process.  
 
Other limitations of this study should also be acknowledged. Firstly, we only took into 
account the date at which funding was received and papers published to determine the period 
during which researchers were active and to annualize the indicators. We can conclude that 
funding is related with output and impact and that each indicator has in most cases a rapid 
growth followed by a slower growth and sometimes even a decline when funding increases. 
However, we cannot infer any causal mechanisms. Along these lines, some of the potential 
outcomes of funding and research cannot be measured with bibliometric indicators (e.g., the 
number of students trained and social outcomes). Also, the funding received is sometimes 
linked to a particular project, and our study does not focus on the research output linked such 
specific grants. Thus, further research could aim at comparing research output and impact of 
funded projects specifically using funding acknowledgements, for example. Our study also 
didn’t look at indicators of technology transfer (i.e. patents). As Bolli and Somogyi (2011) 
have found, technology transfer activities can have an impact on the relation observed 
between third party funding and basic research output. Another limitation comes from the 
lower coverage of the SS research output in the Web of Science (Archambault et al. 2006; 
Larivière et al. 2006; Mongeon & Paul-Hus 2015). Since researchers in SS are more likely 
than those in Health or NSE to write books or publish in local journals not included in the 
Web of Science, a significant part of their output could not be taken into account in this study. 
Furthermore, the timeframe of the analysis (1998-2013) involves that not all articles had the 
same time to accumulate citations. An article published in 2001, for example, might have 
accumulated more citation than a more recent article just because it had more time to do so. 
Conclusion 
In a context where financial resources devoted to research are declining in constant dollars in 
many countries, it is important to ask whether the manner through which research funding is 
allocated is optimal. The results presented in this paper suggest that it might not be the case. 
Both in terms of the quantity of papers produced and of their scientific impact, the 
  
concentration of research funding in the hands of a so-called ‘elite’ of researchers produces 
diminishing marginal returns. From a policy perspective, this suggests that even though more 
funding does in general lead to a higher number of publications, giving bigger grants to fewer 
individuals may not be optimal. If the objective is to maximize output, then giving smaller 
grants to more researchers seems to be a better policy. In terms of scientific impact, the 
quickly reached plateau indicates that increasing funding has a very small effect on the 
average relative citations. Again, if the goal of research funding is to generate research that 
has a greater impact overall, our results suggest that giving smaller grants to a larger number 
of researchers may be a better decision, leading to more publications and citations overall. 
Thus, our results support the idea that a more egalitarian distribution of funds would yield 
greater collective gains for the scientific community. However, it should be stressed here that 
research output and impact do not necessarily equate with societal impact, so our findings do 
not support the claim that a more egalitarian distribution of funds would be better for society 
as a whole. Nonetheless, it should be understood that the main determinant of scientific 
production is not so much the money invested but rather the number of researchers at work 
(Abt 2007), and that by funding a greater number of researchers, we increase the overall 
research productivity. Furthermore, there is a certain degree of serendipity associated with 
scientific discoveries and funding the work of as many researchers as possible increases the 
likelihood that some of them make major discoveries.  
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